A widely held belief in financial economics suggests that stock prices always adequately reflect all available information. Price movements away from fundamentals are assumed to occur only infrequently, if at all. "False" prices are supposed to be corrected by the counter-actions of "rational" investors reestablishing equilibrium. However, empirical evidence of widespread irrationality among investors as well as theoretical insights into the properties of complex systems suggest that this view is too static. In fact, it can be shown that under certain conditions dynamic disequilibria have a considerable probability of being "locked in". The mass media play no mean role in this: By conditioning trend-following behavior and fostering coordination among large numbers of investors, the media can help bring about such destabilizing moves. Media attention can induce positive feedback by increasing the level of excess noise in the market while decreasing the number of perceived behavioral options. Meta-communication thus generated is a prime source of instability in financial markets.
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Introduction
Conventional financial market research assumes that price movements away from fundamental values are rather rare and, if they occur, that they are often quickly corrected. Stock prices thus always adequately reflect all available information. According to this model, the mass media do not play a substantial role in price formation. Rather, they are important as a transmission channel in which news is passed on to market participants as quickly as possible. In fact, this approach sees the mass media as a factor which contributes to the increase of market efficiency: By providing information relevant for stock prices more and more quickly for a continously broadening audience, they accelerate the process of finding the "correct price".
In order for this to happen, one prerequisite is indispensable: Information that the media offers about the real economic situation has to be as accurate as possible. This means that the contribution of the mass media to market efficiency decisively depends on the question whether they can paint, naively speaking, an "undistorted" picture of economic activity. If they cannot, it is very well conceivable that media impact leads to unusual effects which are in no way related to fundamental values. However, the findings of communication research are legion which show that the media may play a lot of different roles, but definitely not this one: the role of providers of reality "as it is". Thus, as long as the media are ignored as an autonomous factor which conditions market reactions, a decisive piece of a very complex puzzle is left out.
The media structure contents by selecting and evaluating; the weighting of information in the media, however, never corresponds to the distribution of information in reality. The media produce explanations by establishing logical links and causal relations; these interpretations, though, are only more or less adequate to reality. The media enrich information by adding new elements such as "emotion" or "suspense"; through this process, however, the character of the information is altered. The media can even create their own events where nothing would happen otherwise -or they can encourage others to do so. In short: The media select, they interpret, they emotionalize and they create facts.
As generators of attention, the media are prone to condition selective awareness: The media not only reduce reality by lowering information density. They focus reality by accumulating information where "actually" none exists. The goal behind this is to win public attention, to control it and to keep it as long as possible. Ideally (from the point of view of the media), feedback loops are generated in which selected events increase attention, which, on the other hand, serves as a proof for the importance of the news, whose visibility then is increased even further. These mechanisms cannot only be found in the entertainment sector; they can also be encountered in the information media, the general news media, as well as in the business media.
One thing is for certain, and that is that the media are far from being the neutral transmitters of news, as suggested in the abstract world of efficient markets. The news stream of the mass media definitely does not follow a random pattern. This does not necessarily and systematically lead to non-random prices: As empirical evidence of the effects of news on stock prices demonstrates, price reactions triggered by media reports are nothing unusual, but most of the time, they do not occur systematically. In principle, however, there is the possibility that the media, due to their function of generating selective awareness and selective behavior, induce and reinforce specific market reactions which develop into dynamic interactions afterwards.
In the following, the results of psychological studies, results of empirical media research, and of empirical financial economics as well as recent theoretical work on complex systems are consulted in order to gain an insight into the dynamics of markets under growing media presence. The underlying idea is that financial markets are dynamic systems whose behavior can change in interaction with environmental conditions and due to internal mechanisms, and which thus do not permanently show the same stable processes. Our assumption is that the interpenetration of markets and the media has brought about major changes. The following questions are to be settled: Do dynamic interactions between markets and the media exist? And if yes, which?
Feedback: The Media as "Learning-Lab"
One precondition for the emergence of systematic price movements is the establishment of feedback between stock prices and investors: Investment decisions in this case are not orientated to fundamentals, but to price developments in the past. If the media functioned as a link supporting such processes, considerable dynamic interactions would be conceivable. argues that it is possibly feedback processes that underlie many of the daily price fluctuations which are so difficult to explain. 7 In the short, medium or long term, on a smaller as well as on a larger scale, according to Shiller, feedback does not seem to be unusual in speculative markets.
Do the media have the potential to generate such a feedback? The results of media effects research clearly indicate it. Nobody disputes that the media mark out the limits of discourse and influence patterns of perception by setting the public agenda. The news, especially television news, define the thematic grounds on which the majority of the audience moves. 8 Media accounts thus have an immediate influence on the relative attention which individual topics gain in the public awareness. By emphasizing certain contents and suppressing others, the media do not only have an impact on what preoccupies people's minds, but also on how they judge these things. 9 The manner how news present the world rubs off on the perceptions of the audience.
Such consequences of the consumption of media constructions of reality can be measured in spot checks. Cumulatively, they condense into patterns of 7 perception which are strongly conditioned by media representations: Regular media consumption can have the effect of cultivating attitudes and opinions which come closer and closer to the media version of reality. 10 These perceptions, on the other hand, can constitute the basis for future patterns of behavior. Conditioning the perceptions of large numbers of individuals could thus cumulatively generate a kind of homogenous mass behavior. 11 The overrepresentation of certain media contents increases the probability of behavioral dispositions condensing into certain patterns. In a word: The mass media are a motor of social feedback. Potentially a very strong one.
There are more and more theoretical, experimental and empirical findings indicating feedback induced by the media in the financial markets: Merton (1987) demands that the "evolution of institutions and information technologies" be taken into account in order to adequately describe the long-term dynamics of the financial markets. 12 For an investor could only buy a stock if he knew it. But the attention of investors is not distributed equally across the market. The media therefore play a key role: "A newspaper or other mass media story about the firm or its industry", Merton says, "that reaches a large number of investors who are not currently shareholders, could induce some of this number to incur the set-up costs and follow the firm." 13 In brief: The media draw potential investors into the market.
Merton makes the attempt to explain the changes in market dynamics within the framework of conventional models of rational investor behavior.
For this purpose, however, he starts from the -hardly realistic -assumption that media accounts of companies and industries are always caused by changes in fundamental factors. He is wise to point out that the expansion of the influence of mass media specifically supports models of irrational investor behavior. "In such models", according to Merton, "media coverage, public relations and other forms of investment marketing could play an important causal role in creating and sustaining speculative bubbles and fads among inves- The random character of price movements and their complexity is no adequate subject for news. They are "explained away" in the media until a picture of the markets emerges which systematically deviates from real market processes. The media thus structure the decision-making horizon of the market participants following them: by foccussing the audience's attention through selectivity and publicity; and by underlying random processes with a logic which gives the impression of trends (but which in fact follows the rules of journalistic strategies of presentation). It is highly probable that this kind of coverage reinforces the latent tendency of investors to see trends where there are none. And to behave accordingly. considers that the relationship of markets and the media is a very complex one: "News stories rarely have a simple, predictable effect on the market." 21 In many ways, Shiller says, media effects are even overestimated. But the media can set the basis for certain market movements and provide their triggers. According to Shiller, "cascade effects" can be generated by attention which generates even more attention: The news present price changes and reinforce their "actual" weight by cumulating attention. This again leads to increased attention and potentially stronger price movements -a feedback mechanism which can provoke extreme price movements.
The bottom line is that growing media influence seems to create the conditions for an increasingly strong herd instinct among market participants. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) point out that under certain circumstances, a homogenization of the decisions of many investors is observable. By watching the behavior of other investors and imitating it afterwards, chain reactions can be set off among market participants. According to the authors, imitating role models present in the media plays a role as well. The infection with emotions such as panic or euphoria also is a common phenomenon in practice. As a huge "learning lab", the mass media are predestined to encourage such accumulations of behavior.
News Structures: "Use Value" and "Narrative Imparative"
The media follow the laws of competitive publicity -including the business media: Use value and sound information are announced. In reality, however, the tools of the attention industry are being applied: What is offered is suspense and action, stars and starlets, hopes and dreams, phantasies of redemption. And promises: Simple recipes for accumulating great wealth are booming. Behind the surface structure of the announced information, there are deep structures which evoke affective reactions among the audience. In times of fierce competition, the media are eager to increase customer loyalty by establishing an emotional feedback in order to gain competitive advantages. The aesthetics of presentation follow the logic of the competition for attention as well: The make-up of many business magazines is consciously designed to trigger an emotional reaction. Even news television increasingly tends to follow the path of emotionalizing. Presenting affectively charged material, bringing out the human interest components, highlighting the personality aspect -the rivalry between the media favors a climate in which the exaggeration of contents and the calculation of effects are pursued systematically.
As a result, this leads to a permanent balancing act between the promise of trustworthiness and the temptation of effect. 27 What differentiates the business media from one another is the presentation and the design -sensationalism, storytelling, superlatives -rather than their ideological profile. Both liberal and conservative media operate within the same discursive limits: a market ideology which considers the liberalization of the financial system as inevitable and desirable and the involvement of larger and larger shares of the population in the stock market as a sign of progress. 28 The central question of the business media is when to invest and how much.
And not, if at all. A relativization of this macro-story from an ideological perspective does not take place.
It is not only in times of an economic boom that the tone of many business media is characterized by permanent optimism. There are economic reasons for this as well: The business media depend on a positive market environment.
Particularly the success of publications oriented towards the capital market strongly correlates with market sentiments. In rising markets, circulation and ratings rise, in falling markets, they fall. 29 Therefore positive scenarios of the future are desirable. Pessimistic prognoses are not seen fit to achieve this goal.
This is obvious when looking at the ratio of buy and sell recommendations:
Very rarely, articles recommend to sell investment securities. The large majority of stock evaluations are buy recommendations.
30
"There was enormous pressure to report positively about what was going on at the stock market", a journalist of a financial magazine admitted during the stock market boom. 31 And even during the downturn, the coverage highlighted the positive aspects. 32 An explanation could be: The more people feel attracted by the markets, the higher the profits of financial service providers.
As a consequence, their budgets for advertisements in the business media grow. One central aspect, however, is thus neglected: The risks of the stock markets are ignored. In many media reports, authors overlook that the chances to obtain the expected yield are bought by taking serious risks. 33 This certainly does not contribute to an increased risk awareness among investors. text for considering its outlook that it is hard to believe that the writer was other than cynical in his or her approach." 36 There are thus many signs indicating that the news structures of business coverage are not very beneficial to rational, critical, sensible, differentiated and diversified investor behavior.
Media Manias: The "CNBC-Effect"
The structure of news contents would be of limited interest if is was not trans- Nowhere else are autonomous media effects more obvious that in case of fictitious news which do not have any real economic content at all. For exam-ple in case of manipulations of information in order to influence and deceive market participants: Price swings after the deliberate publication of false information show that news per se can be followed by substantial price movements, which are not immediately corrected by the market. In such cases of "invented" information, it turns out that investor reactions occur in the financial markets which represent a mere function of media publicity. A price reaction to the substance of the news is not possible, for there is no such substance.
A well-known example is the case of Emulex: The stock of the Californian maker of network products was under strong selling pressure after a fake report with a negative content had circulated on the internet: It claimed that the CEO had resigned and that the company would soon publish a profit revision.
The stock price fell by more than 50 per cent in only a few minutes, a decrease in the market capitalization of about two billion Dollars. In other words: The fake piece of news, which had been disseminated with the intention to manipulate, had a strong effect on the stock price of the company concerned -although (or perhaps even because) it was fundamentally fictitious. The law enforcement authorities were convinced by the impact of the false report: When the author was identified, he was sentenced to serve a long imprisonment. 38 In another case, a swindler managed to make stock prices of a company soar by publishing a false report. The stocks of Pairgain Technologies had steadily lost in market value before one day, the price suddenly rocketed. For a short period of time, the stock rose from 8,50 to more than 11 Dollars, a temporary increase in value of more than 30 per cent. 39 In the market, rumors had circulated that Pairgain was to be taken over for twice as much as its actual market value. Little later, it turned out that the story was completely fictitious and had been disseminated through an internet message board. In this case, the courts were convinced of the effect of the false information as well.
After his arrest, the perpetrator was sentenced to pay a high fine. 40 Media effects can not always be isolated in such an accurate way. For example, the average price movements following stock recommendations, which can also be considered media non-events, are often much less pronounced than in case of the described manipulation of information. Nevertheless, the publicity effect proves that market participants are prompted by the recom- Following an old saying by McLuhan, the medium actually seems to be the message in case of these reactions. These occurences are very meaningful for understanding the dynamics of markets and the media since they are a matter of price movements which are causally related to the mass media -and therefore demonstrate an autonomous role of the media. However, it would be an oversimplification to be satisfied with the attempt to isolate such manifest short-term media effects: Firstly, these effects mostly occur sporadically, which makes it difficult to deduce any general statements about "laws" without overcharging them with auxiliary hypotheses. 43 Secondly, the complex systemic interactions between markets and the media would not even be considered when concentrating on isolated effects.
Meta-Communication: Media-induced Dynamic Interactions
Are overreactions to media reports solely the result of rash reactions of naive traders who are under a misapprehension and follow vacuous information? Or is there a change in market dynamics? The evidence suggests the latter. Dynamic price trends are elicited by different types of investors who interact with one another: growing numbers of noise traders, whose attention is drawn to the markets by the media, and who act on the basis of "used" news; and growing numbers of momentum traders who act reflectively and try to make a profit from the price movements generated by the noise traders. This would explain the observation of Fischer Black (1986) that rational and irrational traders are often difficult to distinguish. 44 Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that the demand pattern of investors who follow pseudo-information such as stock recommendations, is hardly rational. 45 They say that noise traders are often subject to homogenous group behavior, which could have the effect that they gain a significant influence on the aggregate level. Despite their "actually" incorrect behavior, they could be successful temporarily as a group. This, on the other hand, brings imitators on to the scene and further increases their influence in the market. 46 The price movements thus provoked, the authors say, are not always corrected by ra-tional investors (arbitrageurs): either because price fluctuations elicited by irrational traders increase the risk too much and prevent counter-action; or because it pays off to swim with the tide and to intensify price dynamics. 47 If rational investors follow the latter strategy, it is temporarily impossible to distinguish between noise traders and "information holders" because they behave identically. In fact, it is conceivable that a kind of "professionalization" takes place even among noise traders, in the sense that they learn with time that they do not possess any real information and focus exclusively on anticipating the reactions of the bulk of their colleagues. The "rational" momentum traders do not behave differently anyway. The prerequisites for a reflexive behavior of investors, which ignores fundamentals and is oriented at the behavior of others, is enormously reinforced by the feedback mechanism of the media. 48 From this point of view, the media have, above all, one function: They are a device which facilitates strategically calculated coordination.
This kind of self-reflexiveness can have various reasons: the tendency, supported by the media, to extrapolate trends; the gradual realization on the part of the noise traders that the information available to them has already been used at the time of the publication; but also the increasing self-reference of the journalists: Self-referentiality has become firmly established in the media as a strategic ritual. Similar to the stock market gurus, who warn of other gurus, the media increasingly comment on current developments with reference to or even warnings of the coverage of other media. The participation of the journalists in the generation of many events is often explicitly pointed out. 49 Choosing themselves as theme for the media has the primary function of immunizing themselves against criticism of their view of reality. This choice makes it possible to simulate a distance from the things they report about.
Among internet commentators in particular, this kind of pseudo-enlightenment has become very popular: The greatest "noise critics" are also the greatest "noise makers". 50 One cannot rule out the possibility that this builds up a critical attitude towards the news among the audience. Without doubt, the media- dividual perspective, it would therefore be rational to integrate a technical component, which possibly has the effect that in subsequent "rounds of the game", technical strategies are preferred in the selection. 53 As soon as the majority of market participants relies on technical strategies, however, the result for every single actor deteriorates. As soon as it is pursued by the group, the individually rational behavior collectively produces a suboptimal result. 54 The explanation for this seemingly paradoxical finding is the following:
The more traders extrapolate trends, the more frequently positive feedback and self-fulfilling prophecies occur. If more and more actors follow a trend, noise and price bubbles are the consequence. Volatility increases, which makes it increasingly difficult to give accurate forecasts. On average, the result for all market participants gets worse. This process therefore shows the structure of an iterated n-person game with one dominant strategy, that produces a collectively dissatisfying result: the typical structure of a prisoner's dilemma. 55 A more recent theroretical approach points into the same direction: noise in the process of price formation; attempts of investors to derive a benefit from it; the dominance of trend following strategies; generation of positive feedback; and a suboptimal result for all: These are typical features of financial systems as they have recently been modeled through analogies from physics and mathematical biology. 56 Such complex adaptive systems are characterized by the fact that they do not automatically head for an equilibrium, but temporarily become more imbalanced. Slight changes accumulate into complex interactions which can cause the whole system to "collapse" -which results in the boom-crash-cycles that are so typical in the financial markets. 57 In these models, particular attention is given to the role of the perceptions of market participants: The perceptions of market participants depend on the perceptions they expect from other market participants, who, on the other hand, take into account the perceptions of still other market participants: a self-referential and indeterminate, and above all, as Brian Arthur (1995) points out: an instable process. 58 The investors' expectations depend on the supposed expectations of other investors, and their expectations again depend on expectations they assume other investors to have. 59 In the Rorschach image of chaotic price information, a slight hint of a pattern is enough to set off a selfreinforcing trend. Such hints are permanently provided by the professional pattern seekers from the mass media.
Crash: Media and Market Panics
The development and bursting of the internet bubble provides the most impressive example so far for speculative excesses going along with the mediali- Between 1998 and 2000, the internet sector generated a return of more than 1,000 per cent 61 -a spectacular price increase that did not only seem to be fundamentally unsecured after the collapse of the stocks: A number of market observers already described the prices as unjustified during the euphoric boom period. 62 But why did an early price adjustment by sceptical actors not take place? Ofek and Richardson provide evidence indicating that the pessimists (who later turned out to be the realists) were "run over" by the optimists. According to the authors, private investors, among them many novices in the stock market, believed the internet "hype" and marched into the same direction in huge numbers.
Without any doubt, several factors play an important role: a novel kind of technology, whose potential could not be clearly estimated; an inflation of forecasts coming from many analysts, not least motivated by interconnections between investment banks and their clients; limited possibilities to sell securities short, the reason why pessimistic price assessments could not assert themselves; generally exaggerated expectations concerning long-term stock returns.
But the media -finance newspapers, investor magazines and particularly news channels such as CNBC and n-tv -served as a multiplier: They spread the "virus" -the Internet story -globally, according to the overall sound of the coverage, in a positive or even euphoric tone. The good news was disseminated rapidly -until it was taken up by the whole media system. 63 The idea of the cyber-economy made for a strong storyline and caused plenty of attention. And it brought the media breathtaking accruals in advertising. As an empirically weak, but suggestive macro-story, the fiction of the digital knowledge economy provided a projection screen for many effective micro-stories: from the emancipation of the individual due to mobile technology, to wealth for all in the stock exchange, or the revolution of economic activity via the internet. Small wonder that many investors yielded to the temptation:
Obviously, the internet story was highly "infective" when it came across an appropriately pre-conditioned "carrier". The media hype was the sine qua non of the boom and subsequent crash of the "new economy".
This does not imply that the price decline was a phenomenon of irrational novices jumping like lemmings over the cliff of the stock market. Schuster (2001) gives several examples proving that not only uninformed small investors followed the trend of the growth stocks. 64 To mention only one particular case: According to press reports, George Soros did not become strongly involved in technology securities until 1999, shortly before the end of the boom, and therefore suffered heavy losses after the crash. Examples like this refute the popular opinion that the internet euphoria was solely the result of aberrant behavior of irrational private investors. The exaggerations were also brought about by big investors hoping to benefit from price increases -who stirred the euphoria even more. The envy factor is also increased by the media: Reports about easy money foster emulation. Kindleberger comments: "There is nothing so disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich." 72 In times of periodic stock market booms, it seems that the whole neighborhood is rolling in money. Hardly anybody talks about the losers at the markets. The supposed profits of others are an incentive to try one's luck -and to follow the stimulus of the masses. Both factors, the overrating of future profits and the envy effect increase the probability of irrational behavior. This public pressure has become tremendously heavier with the expansion of the business media.
Summary and Conclusions
The expansion of the business media has caused a change in the dynamics of they are to think of all they know about the problem. The briefer that process becomes, the more they will be controlled by the relative accessibility of various considerations." 19 , 165; similarly Pearce and Roley (1985) , 49 20 Cf. Bloomfield and Hales (2001). 21 Shiller (2000), 71. 22 In the US, the expansion of the business media already started during the 1970s. For almost three decades, the extent of business coverage has constantly increased, both in the general news media and in the area of special publications. The stock market boom setting in after 1982 supported this trend. Between 1988 and 1998, the number of business magazines in the US alone increased from 358 to 694. In Europe, the expansion of business coverage set in only later, but reached comparable levels during the 1990s. In the highly competitive communication market of the 90s, finance and business media became one of the fastest growing sectors. For a detailed account see Schuster (2001) , 35-53 and Parker (1997) . 23 The group mentality of journalists reinforces the tendency to homogeneity. The choice of topics and the way they are treated follow professional routines and the impulses of the group -rather than any "objective" necessities. 24 Franck (1998), 170. 25 Iyengar and Kinder (1987) 29 Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2000) . 30 This has got two reasons: Firstly, positive assessments also prevail among jounalists' sources, the analysts. Secondly, the media believe that they can arouse the interest of larger target groups for their product with the help of purchase reports. Their justification is the arithmetics of public demand: A sell recommendation only addresses a minority of viewers and readers, the owners of the stock that is evaluated. A buy recommendation, on the other hand, addresses the majority of the audience, everyone who does not own the stock. 45 Shleifer and Summers (1990), 23 . For details see Cutler et al. (1991 and ; De Long et al. (1989, 1990 and 1991) . 46 For a long time, economic theory started from the assumption that irrational investors quickly disappear from the market because they systematically lose capital to rational opponents. Exemplarily Friedman (1953) . De Long et al. (1991) , on the other hand, point out that noise traders possibly obtain higher returns than rational investors under certain circumstances, since they take higher risks and realize profits for this (unconsciously taken) risk. This is why they might even dominate the market. 47 It is thus incorrect, as , 532 states, that "as the amount of noise trading increases, it will become more profitable for people to trade on information." Black starts from the fact that with increasing noise, rational investors increasingly make aggressive attempts to move prices into the direction of the fundamental values. He points out himself, though, that the information lead "does not guarantee a profit." On the one hand, the risk becomes higher with increasing noise and increasing size of the speculative positions. On the other hand, information traders cannot be sure either if they perhaps only react to noise as well. Black does not consider the possibility that information holders also consciously and deliberately react to noise. 48 Farmer (2002) points out that not only trend following strategies, but also fundamental strategies may induce positive autocorrelations and excessive volatility. 49 The distance from the events and the proximity to sources of primary information play a decisive role: The greater the distance between the medium and the site of the event and the worse its access to the actors, the stronger the tendency to pursue a self-referential kind of communication strategy: Comments are not only made on the events -for there is hardly any contact with them -but also and predominantly on the way other media deal with the events. 50 Exemplarily: Richard McCaffery, "The Market's Missing Ingredient." In: www.fool.com 08/10/2001. 51 Morris and Shin (2001), 2. 52 Morris and Shin (2001), 5 write: "The heightened sensitivities of the market could magnify any noise in the public information to such a large extent that public information ends up by causing more harm than good." 53 Brian Arthur (1995), 24 writes: "Trend expectations in sufficient density in the population of expectations are mutually reinforcing." 54 For an introduction into the Prisoner's Dilemma cf. Axelrod (1984) as well as Rapoport and Chammah (1965) . For an overview of evolutionary game theory cf. Lindgren (1997) and Friedman (1991) . 55 Moreover, the principle applies (regardless of the payoff-structure of different strategies towards each other) that the expected profit of a strategy is diminished with growing numbers of users. 56 An excess of "anomalies" in the context of the efficient market theory incited various researchers to make attempts to come closer to the actual financial markets in their models. They rightly state that conventional finance theory relies too much on on simplistic and unrealistic assumptions -primarily the axiom of "rational agents" and a concept of equilibrium derived from Newtonian physics. The core of studies on complex systems consists in adapting biological theories and their principles of selection in order to deduce rules of economic selection. The objective is to improve the representation of dynamic interactions in markets which appear as exceptions to the rule in models of efficient markets. For an introduction cf. Mauboussin Mauboussin (2002) considers the four following characteristics to be typical for these systems: aggregation, adaption of behavioral rules, non-linearity and feedback. 58 Also cf. Arthur (1988 and . 67 Also cf. Galbraith (1954) . For the counterposition, which seriously questions the existence of price bubbles cf. Garber (1989 and . For the current discussion about speculative mania in the financial markets, its effects on the real economy and possible political counter-measures cf. Hunter, Kaufman and Pomerleano (2003). 68 Kindleberger (1978) , 16.
69 Galbraith (1954) describes the bursting of a bubble as follows: At first, the bubble is defended by those who profit from it, critics are ignored or discredited. Then, the programmed collapse takes its course: Business outlooks and price forecasts are systematically missed. Many promises, especially those dating from the phase of euphoria, turn out to be lies. Many people lose their money, financial devastation is the consequence. But the shock is only short-lived, the markets have no memory. The reasons for the crash are not discussed, the disaster quickly sinks into oblivion. And speculation starts all over again. 70 Shiller (2000), 71 . 71 The biologist Richard Dawkins (1976) developed a concept of self-replicating ideas which he calls "memes" in his book The Selfish Gene. According to Dawkins, "memes" lead a life of their own, they spread like a virus and sometimes cause mass infections. Memes are passed on from one person to the next through imitation. This theory of thought infections, which are also and particularly spread by the media, gave cause to the assumption that memetic infections play a role in the financial markets. This theory is somewhat tautological and should probably only be considered as a graphic metaphor. As such, however, it is quite interesting heuristically, since it focusses attention on processes of mass dissemination of irrational ideas and ways of behavior, such as mass hysteria and panic. Cf. Dawkins (1976 and ; Frank (1999) ; Lynch (1996) . 72 Kindleberger (1978) , 15.
